aspects of the notion of reason (and, therefore, of the principle of sufficient reason), not only the reason for coming to be and the reason for existing (vatioficndi and ratio existendi), but also the reason for the essential determinations of a thing and the reason for our knowing that a thing is thus and so (ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi)-at least when these notions are applied to the only objects for which one can affirm the universal validity of some version of the principle of sufficient reason, the objects of our perceptual experience.
In talking of " Kant Experience, in the Critique of Pure reason ' 11 his ~x-e-critical t c x t . S e c o n d , Kant's Reason.
new definition, in the critical period, o f all types of ratio (reason or ground) and all aspects of the principle of sufficient reason. ' One interesting result of comparing Kant's pre-critical and critical view is that a striking reversal i n Kant's method of proof becomes apparent. In the pre-critical text, Kant starts from a logical/ontological principle of sufficient reason, moves from there to a principle of sufficient reason of existence (which he equates with the causal principle), and from there to what he calls a principle of succession (a principle of sutficiknt reason for the changes of states in a substance). By contrast, in the critical tcxt (the Second Analogy of Experience), Kant proves the principle of succession, which he equates with the causal principle, and in doin8 this provides "the only proof' of thc principle of suflicient reason of existence and-I shall arguealso redefines the respective status of the ontological a n d logical principles thenlselves. In short, instead of moving from logic to time-detcrmination, one moves from time-determination to logic. This reversal of method is related to the discovery of a completely new reason o r ground: the 'transcendental unity of consciousness' as the reason of reasons, or the ground for there being any principle of sufficient reason at all. The discovery of this new ground has striking consequences for Kant's critical concept of freedom, which I shall consider at the end of the paper. determines a subject with respect to a predicate is called the reason. One distinguishes an antecedently and a consequently determining reason. The antecedently determining reason is that whose notion precedes what is determined, i s . that without which what is determined is not intelligible.* The consequently determining reason is that which would not be posited unless the notion of what is determined were already posited from elsewhere. The former can also be called reason why or reason for the being or becoming (rationem cur scilicet essendi vel jiendi); the latter c m be called reason that or reason of knowing ( rationem quod scilicet ci~nosccndi).
* T o this one may add the identical reason where the notion of the subject determines the predicate through its perfect identity with it, for instance a triangle has three sides; where the notion of the deternmined neither follows nor precedes that of the determining. ' Kant gives two examples. Here's the first: we have a consequently detcrnmining reason for affirming that the world contains many ills, namely our own experience of those ills. But if we also look for an antecederztly determining reason, we must search for that which, in the essence of the world, o r in its relation to some other being, provides the ground or reason for the predicate's ( f i r example, "containing many ills") being attributed to the subject ("world") and its opposite (say: "perfectly good") being excluded.
Kant's second example is the following: we have a consequently determining reason for asserting that light travels not instantaneously but with an ascribable speed. This reason consists in the eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter-or more precisely, in the delay in our observation of those eclipses-a delay that is a consequence of the non-instantaneous travel of light. But we also have an antecedently determining reason. This consists, according to Kant, in the elasticity of the aether particles through which light travels, which delays its movement."
The distinction between antecedently and consequently determining reason, as presented here, is a bit disconcerting: clearly, the two kinds of 'reason' are quite hctcrogeneous. One is a reason for holding the proposition to be true. The other is a reason for the proposition's being true, that is, for the state of affairs to obtain. Kant does recognize this ditTerence, since at the end of his definition lie characterizes the former as a reason for knowing (ratio cognoscendi), the latter as a reason for being or becoming (ratio essendi vtl jiendi). But he docs not stress this aspect of the distinction in his initial characterization of reasons. Both reasons are described as reasons for the determination of a subject with respect to a predicate. This seeming hesitation in Kant's definition of reason (ground) will be important for what follows.
Having thus defined the notion of reason (ratio) and distinguished two main kinds of determining reason, Kant criticizes Wolffs definition. Wolff, lie says, "defines reason (or ground) as that from which it is possible to understand why something is rather than is not" (dejinit enim rationem per id, unde intellig-i potest, cur aliquid potius sit, quam non sit)." Kant objects that this definition is circular. It amounts to saying: "Reason is that from which it is possible to understand for what reason something is rather than is not." This circularity is avoided if one says, rather: reason is that by which the subject of a proposition is determined, that is, that by virtue of which a predicate is posited and its opposite is negated. That is why it is preferable to speak of determining rather than sufficient reason. ' But is it so clear that the Wolffian definition is circular? It is so only if the same thing is meant by 'reason' (in: "reason is that from which it is possible to understand," ratio est, unde intelligi potest ) and by 'why' ("why something is rather than is not," cur aliquid sitpotius quam non sit). But that's not necessarily so. Wolff might have meant that the reason in the proposition is that from which it is possible to understand the why (the reason) in thingr. This is where the distinction between antecedently and consequently determining reason comes into play. But if one accepts it, then another, more severe objection t o Wolff is in order. For as we saw, Kant expressly says that the antecedently determining reason is a reason why (ratio cur) but that the consequently determining reason is only a reason that (ratio quod). Given this distinction, why does Kant not make this objection t o W o l f (the reason why is not the only kind of reason), an objection that seems, at this point, more damning than that of circularity? This is probably because he also shares Wolfits (and Leibniz's) view that the only reason worthy of the name is the antecedently determining reason. For only it is not just a reason for our holding a proposition to be true but a reason for its being true. Here's what he says on the example of the world and its ills:
Suppose we look for the reason of ills in the world. We have thus a proposition: the world contains many ills. We are not looking for the reason that or reason of knowing, for our own experience plays this role; but we are looking for the reason why or the reason for coming t o be (ratio cur scilicet fiendi), i.e. a reason such that when it is posited, we understand that the world is not undetermined with respect to the predicate but on the contrary, the predicate of ills is posited, and the opposite is excluded. The reason (ground), therefore, determines what is at first indeterminate. And since all truth is produced by the determination of a predicate in a subject, the determining reason is not only a criterion of truth, but its source, without which there would remain many possibles, but nothing true.'
The whole ambiguity of Kant's position is manifest in this passage. For on the one hand, Kant's notion of reason (ground) is characterized as a reason for asserting a predicate of a subject, without which there would be no proposition susceptible of truth or falsity, that is to say, on our part, us judging subjects, no act of asserting rather than suspending our judgment. And the force of his statement that there must always be a reason for determining a subject with respect to a predicate clearly rests o n the common intuition that we need a reason for holding a proposition to be true. But understood in this way, the reason could very well be what Kant calls a mere criterion of truth and not its source. Nonetheless, Kant immediately adds: the reason is not simply a criterion. T o deserve the name 'reason', it has to be the source of the truth of the proposition.
The very same ambiguity is at work in Kant's pre-critical proof of the principle of sufficient reason (or of determining reason). The principle is thus formulated: "Nothing is true without a determining reason." Here, 'nothing' clearly means 'no proposition', as is shown in the proof that immediately follows his statement of the principle:
(1) All (1) and (2) ( 4 ) ) This "proof" does little more than restate what was already said in Kant's initial characterization of a 'reason': a true proposition is one in which a subject is determined with respect t o a predicate (premise (1)). What does the determination is the reason (premise (2), propositions ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) derived from (1) and (2)).
Consider again the proposition: "Light travels with an assignable, finite speed." T o think that the proposition is true is to assert that the predicate, "travelling with an assignable, finite speed," belongs to the subject, "light," and that its negation, "travels instantaneously," is excluded (this is what premise ( 1 ) says). However, for such an exclusion to obtain, there needs t o be a reason (otherwise we might admit as problematic or as possible both judgments, light travels instantaneously, light travels with an assignable, finite speed). Now, the consequently determining reason provided by the delay in our observation of the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites excludes that the travel should be instantaneous, by virtue of the syllogism in modus tollens: "If all light-travel is instantaneous, there is no delay in the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites; however, there is a delay. So, it is not the case that all lighttravel is instantaneous." For its part the antecedently determining reason excludes instantaneous travel by the syllogism in modus ponens: "If aether particles are elastic, then all light travel is delayed (non-instantaneous); however, aether particles are elastic. So, all light travel is delayed." The exclusion of the opposite predicate may be derived either from the modus tollens appropriate to the consequently determining reason or from the modus ponens appropriate to the antecedently determining reason." ' We see again on this example that, even if it is granted that a reason is needed for moving from a merely problematic judgment (one with respect to which assent is suspended) to a proposition (a judgment asserted as true), it does not follow at all that for every truth there is an antecedently determining reason, ratio cur. Nonetheless, just as in his definition of 'reason' (ratio, Grund, ground) Kant moved w i t h o u t any a r g u m e n t from distinguishing between t w o types o f reason (antecedently and consequently determining reason) to maintaining that only one kind of reason is relevant (the antecedently determining reason, reason for being or becoming, reason why), similarly here, Kant substitutes for the cautious conclusion that it is in the nature of propositions (assertoric judgments) that there should be a reason for the determination of the subject in relation t o the predicate (whether this reason be antecedently o r consequently determined), a far more ambitious statement: there is always an antecedently determining reason.
That the knowledge of truth always demands that we perceive a reason, this is affirmed by the common sense of all n~ortals. But most often we are content with a consequently determining reason, when what is at issue is only our certainty; but it is easy to see, from the theorem and the definition, that there is always an antecedently determining reason or, if you prefer, a genetic or an identical reason; for the consequently determining reason does not wake truth, but only presents it."
From this ambitious version of the principle of sufficient reason, Kant derives important metaphysical consequences that in the years to come will motivate his growing discomfort with his own pre-critical position, and more generally with rational metaphysics.
The first consequence of this is a proof of the principle of sufficient reason for the existence of contingent things. This is where the concept of cause occurs for the first time in the New Elucidation: the reason of existence is a cause.
As a preliminary to proving a principle of sufficient reason of existence, Kant first establishes the negative proposition, "It is absurd that something s h o~d d have in itself the reason of its exi~tence."'~ His proof for this proposition rests o n the-unquestioned-assun~ption that a cause necessarily precedes its efkct in time. So, if a thing were the cause of itself, it would have to precede its own existence in time, which is absurd. Therefore nothing is the reason of its own existence: Kant expressly opposes Spinoza's notion of a God that is causa sui, cause of itself.
O n the other hand it is true to say that God's existence is necessary, or that the proposition, "God exists," is necessarily true. Rut this is not because God is the cause of Himself. It is not even because His existence is contained in His essence (as in the "Cartesian proof'). Rather, it is because H e is the unique being that is the ground of everything possible. I will not attempt to lay out and analyze Kant's proof of this point. I only want to point out that, according to Kant's pre-critical view, if we affirm the existence of God, o r if we assert the proposition, "God exists," as necessarily true, it is not by virtue of an antecedently determining reason (whether of being, of coming to be, o r of existing): We d o not know why God exists. But we d o know that He exists and that this existence is absolutely necessary. We know this by a reason for knowing of a unique kind, which Kant will further elaborate in the 1763 text, The Only Possible Foundation for a Prooj'ofthe Existence ofGod and then thoroughly refute in the Transcendental Ideal of the first Critique.'" Kant then sets about proving a principle of antecedently determining reason for the existence of contingent things. The principle is: "Nothing contingent can be without an antecedently determining reason (a cause) of its existence."
The proof, summarized schematically, is the following.
(1) Suppose a contingent thing exists without an antecedently determining reason. (2) As an existing thing, it is completely determined, and the opposite of each of its determinations is excluded. (definition of existence as complete determination) (3) But according to the hypothesis, this exclusion has n o other reason than the thing's existence itself. Even more, this exclusion is identical: the very fact that the thing exists is what excludes its non-existing. (4) But this amounts to saying that its existence is absolutely necessary, which is contrary t o the hypothesis.
(5) So, nothing contingent can be without an antecedently determining reason.
The proof rests on three presuppositions: (a) existence is complete determination: an existing thing is individuated by the fact that, givcn the totality of possible predicates, for each and every one of them, either it or its negation is true of the individual existing thing; ( b ) as such, it falls under the principle of determining reason stated above; ( i ) this principle should be understood as a principle of antecedently determininj reason. If we accept all three presuppositions, then we can avoid the absurd conclusion that a contintlent existence is almsolutely necessary only if we accept that every contingent thing has an antcccdently determining reason not only of its essential and accidental determinations (ratio essendi vel jicndi) but of its existence itself (mtio cxistendi).
The second consequence is a 'principle of succession', statcd as follows: "No change can atkct substances except insofar as they arc related to other substances, and their reciprocal dependance deternmines their mutual change of state." Kant's argument for this principle is that if the ground or reason of the change of state of a substance were within it, then the state that comes to be should always have been (given that its ratio jiendi was always present in the substance). So, a state that mas not and comes to be must have its ground not in the substance itself but in its relation t o another substance or to other substances.
(This is of course a fundamentally anti-Leibnizian view: contrary t o Leibniz, according t o Kant individual substances have real injluencc upon one another's states).'-' Finally, Kant devotes a fairly long discussion to the relationship between the principle of sufficient reason and human freedom. Here he opposes a view defended by his predecessor Crusius. According to Crusius, in some cases asserting the existence of a state of atfairs or an event is without an antecedently determining reason. It can be at3rmed only by virtue of a ratio cignoscendi, which is none other than existence itself as attested by experience. Such is the case with free action: that the will should decide of its own free choice, without any antecedently determining reason, in favour of one action rather than another, is a fact attested by experience. T o this Kant objects that if an action, o r the will's determination t o act, were without an antecedently determining reason, then, since the determination of the will to act and the ensuing action have not always existed, their transition into existence would remain undetermined-that is to say, for the action as well as for the determination of the will, it would remain undetermined that it should be rather than not be. Kant's response in this case rests on the same presuppositions as his general argument concerning the reason of existence: in order t o atfirm that a thing has come to be, we need not only a ratio cognoscendi (ratio consequenter detcrminans), but also a ratiofiendi, the ratio antecedenter deterrninans of its complete determination.'" T o the question: "is this principle of reason applied to human action compatible with freedom of the will and freedom of action?" Kant answers-again against Crusius-that being free is not acting without a reason, but on the contrary acting from an internal reason that inclines one to act without any hesitation or doubt in one way rather than another. Kant, here, is faithfully Leibnizian. I have suggested above that the main weakness of Kant's argument is the way in which Kant jumps from the distinction between antecedently and consequently determining reason for asserting the truth of a proposition to the claim that t h e r e is always an antecedently determin- the rationaturn. For the analysis of these cases, Kant introduces, at the b e g i n n i n g o f t h e 1760s, the distinction between logical reason and real reason (or logical ground and real ground) and underlines the synthetic character of the real ground. With the Humean alarm-clock doing its work, the investigation of the relationship of real ground to its consequences becomes generalized into an investigation concerning the notion of reason or ground in general, and the principle of sufficient reason itself. poses the question it is in the terms of Woltfian School Logic: how are we to understand, "if one thing is posited, another thing is posited at the same time"? This vocabulary is that of Wolfl's analysis of syllogisms in modus ponens. In a hypothetical syllogism, "si antecedens ponitur, ponendum quoque est consequcns," (if the antecedent is posited, the consequent must also be posited). Interestingly, it is in the context of the modus ponens characteristic of real ground that, it seems, Kant introduced for the first time the distinction between analytic and synthetic connection:
Sceptical interlude
The relation of ratio ponens is connection, that of ratio tollens is of opposition. The relation of logical ratio ponens or tollens is analytic-rational. The relation of real ratio ponens or tollens is synthetic-en~pirical.'" Only with the Critique of Pure Reason does Kant think he has solved to his satisfaction the question: what is the nature of the synthetic connection between ratio and rationatum, what is the nature of real ground? His answer is the following: the relationship of real ground, that is to say, the necessary connection between two distinct existences, is the connection that must necessarily exist in order for any order of time to be determinable among the objects of our perceptual experience. Rut then, the 'principle of succession', which in the New Elucidation was a consequencc of the principle of sufficient reason, becomes the ground of its pro($ This means that the whole proof-structure of the NCJV Elucidation is reversed: Kant does not proceed from a principle of reason that is both logical and ontological (every truth must have its reason, every attribution of a property t o a thing must have its reason), to a principle of reason of existence (every contingent existence must have its reason), and finally to a principle of succession (every change of statc of a substance must have its reason in the state, or change of state, of another substance). Instead, he now proceeds from a principle of succession (the Second Analogy of Experience: "everything that happens presupposes something else upon which it follows according t o a rule") to a redefinition of the notion of reason or ground and, with it, to the revision of the principle of reason in all its aspects-whether it concerns the reason of existence, the reason of being or of coming to be, or even the reason of knowing. It is this reversal that I would like now to examine 3. The critical period: objective unity of selfconsciousness and the principle of sufficient reason. (1) Things as they appear to us are perceived as having temporal determina tions (relations of succession and simultaneity) only if they arc related to one another in one time (Transcendental Aesthetic, A30/B46). 
3-1. The proof of the Second Analogy of Experience.
I HAVE ANALYZED THIS P R O O F EL SEW HEW,.^" 1 Wl1.I. NOT ATTEMPT T O REPEAT THIS analysis here, nor will I evaluate Kant's argument in the Second Analogy. I will consider only those aspects of it that are necessary for our understanding of the critical notion of reason o r ground, ratio.
The question Kant asks himself is well known: how d o we relate the subjective succession of our perceptions t o an objective temporal order, given that we have n o perception of "time itself' that could provide us with the temporal coordinates in reference to which we might determine the positions of things or their changes of state? More specifically-this is the problem Kant deals with in the Second Analogy-how d o we relate the subjective succession of our perceptions to an objective succession of the states of things?
Kant's response is in two main stages. One, fairly swift, could be described as phenomenological. It consists in a description of our experience of an objective temporal order. The other, longer and more complex, rests on an argument developed earlier (in the Metaphysical Deduction and the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories), which concerns the role of the logical forms of our judgments in establishing an intentional relationship between our representations and the objects they are the representations of. I will call this second stage the logical stage of the argument of the Second Analogy.
First, the phenomenological stage. We relate the subjective succession of our perceptions to an objective succession of the states of things, Kant maintains, if, and only if, we hold the subjective succession to be determined in its temporal order. In other words, if the subjective succession of perceptions is the perception of an objective succession, perception A that precedes pcrception 13 cannot follow it-or rather, a perception A', generically identical t o perception A that preceded B, cannot follow perception B. To take up the well-known example Kant uses in the Critigue, perceiving that a ship moves downstream: when I have such a perceptual cxpericnce I am aware that I could not decide arbitrarily to reverse the order of my perceptions and, for instance, perceive the ship again at point 1 after perceiving it at point 2. O n the other hand, if the subjective succession is only subjective, that is to say if there corresponds to it in the object a relationship of temporal simultaneity, then I could, if I decided to d o so, reverse the order of my perceptions and have perception A again, or a perception A' generically identical to A, after having perception R (for instance-to take up again Kant's example-perceive the front of the house again after perceiving the back).
One quick comment on this 'phenomenological' stage of the argument and the examples that illustrate it. I think that the best way to understand thc description Kant proposes is to consider it as a description of the use that we make of our imagination in perception. When we perceive a subjective succession as the perception of an objective succession, for instance in the perception of the ship moving downstream, at the very moment that we perceive the second position of the ship, if we imagine that our gaze returns t o the point where we previously perceived the ship, what we imagine is that we w o~~l d not perceive the ship in that place. This is what is meant by saying that the order of perceptions is determined. O f course, if the objective state of affairs were to change (if we had grounds for thinking that the ship had no\\, been towed upstream), we could imagine that if we returned o u r gaze toward the preceding point, we would see the ship again. Therefore the awareness of the determined character of the ordcr of our perception depends not only on our senses, but also on our imagination. It is precisely because it depends on the imagination that it can be guided both by and toward judgment.
And this leads us t o the second stage of Kant's argument. In the first, Kant replied to the question, how is the subjective succession ofour perceptions also the perception of an objective succession? His answer was that this is so just in the cases that the subjective succession is represented as determined in its temporal order (namely, when we don't imagine that we would perceive the same thing if our gaze were to return t o the point upon which it was focused a moment before). But this calls for a second question: how and why d o we hold the subjective succession to be determined in its temporal order (why d o we not imagine that we could again perceive the same state of things at the point upon which we focused our gaze a moment earlier)? Here Kant's answer becomes more complex. I suggest that it is summed up by the following three points: we hold the subjective succession to be determined in its temporal order if, and only if: ( 1 ) we establish an intentional relation between the representation and the independent object of which we take it to be the representation; (2) in doing so, we are led to hold the order of perceptions to be determined in the object, which means that ( 3 ) we presuppose another objective state of things that precedes the perceived succession and that determines its occurrence, according to a rule. Now if this is so, we can conclude that all perceptions of objective successions rest on the presupposition that "son~ething else precedes, upon which the perceived succession follows, according to a rule."*' This "something which precedes, upon which the objective succession follows, according to a rule," is precisely what is called a 'cause'. It is therefore a condition ofthe experience r f objective successions that every event (every objective succession of states in a thing) presupposes something else upon which it follows according to a rule. But according to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, the conditions of the possibility of experience are also the conditions of the possibility of the object of experience. Therefore, it is a condition of the possibility, not only of our experience of an objective succession, but of that succession itself, that something should precede it, upon which it follows according to a rule.
It would be a mistake to believe-as Schopenhauer did2*-that Kant maintains the absurd position that every objective succession is itselj'a causal relation. What Kant maintains is that we perceive-that is to say, we identit? or recognize under a concept (or, more exactly, under concepts combined in judgments)-an objective succession only ifwc suppose a state of things preceding it, upon which it follows according to a rule. For all that, we do not knolz~ this antecedent state of things. We only presuppose it, and because we presuppose it, we strive to identify it. So, for instance, perceiving that the ship, which was at point 1, has moved to point 2, is implicitly holding the proposition, "the ship, which was at p l , has moved to p2," to be the conclusion of a hypothetical syllogism whose major premise, and therefore also whose minor premise, we d o not know: "If q, then the ship, which was at p l , moves to p2; q; therefore, the ship, which was at p l , has moved to p2." If we could not suppose the existence of something that we could think under the antecedent q of a rule, "if q, then the ship, which was at p l , has moved to p2," we would interpret the subjective succession of our perceptions differently. For example, I perceive a tower at point p l , and a moment later I perceive a (qualitatively) identical tower at point p2. It is impossible for me t o suppose something that I could thi~ik of as the antecedent s o f a rule, "if s, then the tower, which was at p l , has moved to p2." I need to order the temporal relation of the objects of my perceptions differently. I conclude that two towers that are qualitatively identical exist simultaneously at two distinct points in space.
The conclusion of the argument, therefore, is: every objective succession of states "presupposes something else upon which it follows according to a rule," that is to say, that it has a cause (ratiofiendi or existendi-both terms are appropriate here): the reason or ground is a ground ofa state's coming to be (ratiofiendi), but it is also the only possible version of the ratio existendi, or ground of existence. The only existence for which one can seek a ratio existendi or cause is the existence of a state of a substance that did not exist beforehand. As for the substance itself, the permanent substratum of every change of state, there is no sense in seeking a ratio existendi, a ground of existence. the essence of a thing (ratio essendi) or in its relation to other things (ratiofitndi vel existendi). But this is because the 'essence' of empirical things, or what Kant now calls their 'nature', consists in the marks under which they can be recognized as appearances, not in the properties they might have as things in themselves. This restriction is what makes it possible to assert the universal validity of the principle of sufficient reason understood as a principle of antecedently determining reason. The reason for a thing's determinations may lie in the (relatively or absolutely) permanent characteristics by which a thing can be recognized as the kind of thing it is (this argument was made in the first Analogy of Experience, which I have not examined h c r e ) . * O r it may lie in "something that precedes any change of state, upon which this change of state follows, according to a rule," (this is the argument of the Second h a l o g y of Experience, which I just briefly recounted). Finally, permanent as well as changing characteristics are determined in the context of the universal reciprocal interaction of all things coexisting in space (this is the argument of the Third Analogy of Experience, the descendant of the principle of coexistence from the New Elucidation). For the essence itself (what I called the relatively or absolutely permanent marks under which a thing is recognized as the kind of thing it is), there is n o reason. It is just a fact about the relation between our cognitive capacities and the state of things that we recognize bodies in general under the marks of extension, figure, and impenetrability. It is a fact about the present use of our recognitional capacities that we recognize beeswax as the kind of thing that is hard, yellowish, and fragrant under normal conditions of temperature but becomes soft, sticky, browner, and so on when heated up. As for the changes of states, for which the Second Analogy provides a principle of sufficient reason, n o ultimate determining reason, or ground, can be found. For any event, the search for "something that precedes, upon which it follows, according to a rule," can go on indefinitely. So, the proof of the principle of suficient reason is also a severe restriction of its scope and force. Nevertheless, because he has thus proved a principle of sufficient reason that is understood as a principle of antecedently deterwinin8 reason, that is reinterpreted in the terms of his critical philosophy, and that itself has its ground or reason in the unity of self-consciousness-the unity and numerical identity of the judging subject-Kant can aftirnm in the Preface t o the Critique of Pure Reason and then again in the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, that it is an unavoidablc destiny of reason (this time as a faculty, Vernztnjt) ahvay to look jbr a jurthcr reason, or~round (Grund) of the objective determinations of things, while at the same time it can never claim to liave found the ultimate ground.
3-2. ratio existendi, ratio fiendi, ratio essendi.

DOES AIL OF THIS SUFFICE TO EXPLAIN WHY T H E (
Finally, it is clear that we must now distinguish between the principle of reason of propositions and the principle of reason of thinjs and their dcternminations. It is a lo~qical principle that every proposition (assertoric judgment) must have a reason, without which it \voi~ld, at best, remain a nlerely problematic judgment whose negation could equally be admitted as problematic (possible). This principle, as Kant points out in the Introduction to the Logic collated by his student Jiische, can be specified in two ways: every assertoric proposition (1) must liave a reason and (2) must not have false conseqi~cnccs.'~ In the first requisite, we may recognize the mere form of the modus poncns proper to the antecedently deterwinin8 reason from the pre-critical N e~v Elucidation, while in the second, we see that of the modus tollens proper to the conseqztently determining reason. But neither of these two versions of the hgical principle of sufficient reason gives us any access t o the reason, or ground, of the determinations of thinjs. That there has to be a reason or ground for the determination of things was proven notflom a hgical principle cfreason jbr the truth of propositions but from an elucidation of the conditions under which we can apprehend a temporal order among the objects of our perceptions."
This restriction of the principle of reason of things and their determinations t o a principle of the determination of an objective tcmporal order, and the foundation of reasons, in the plural (whether empirical or logical), in one transccndental reason o r grou~ld-the unity and identity of the judging subject, or "transcendental unity of self-consciousness"-allow Kant t o present an unprecectented solution to the problen~ of the relationship between the principle of sufficient reason and human freedom.
3-3. The principle of reason and human freedom: the ground beyond grounds (the reason beyond reasons)
IN 1755, KANT INSISTED AGAINST CRUSIUS THAT ADMITTING THE UNIVBKSAI, VALIDIty of the principle of sufficient (or determining) reason was compatible with affirming that human beings are free. For, he said, although it is true that everything that happens-and therefore also every human action-has an antecedently determining reason, in cases where this reason (ground) is not external (as in mechanical causality), but internal (as in divine action, and in those human actions where "the motives of understanding applied t o the will provoke actions")," the action, although certain, is not necessitated. Rut in the Remark o n the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant categorically rejects this kind of solution.
Describing an actio~l as free because its ground is not external but internal an~ounts to attributing to human beings thc "freedom of a turnspit," which has in itself the source of its movement, its position and internal structure at e;~ch 1no1nent determining its position at the following moment. The truth is that in such a situation, each change of state, far from originating from itself a 11cw series of states, is strictly determined by the change that precedes it.27 111 the same way, whatever their mode oj' determination (whether according to the rules of skill, the advice of prudence, or the imperatives of morality), human actions, insofar as they are events in time, are strictly determined by the events that precede them in time. '1'11~ principle of reason of coming to be proven in the second Analogy applies to them as it applies to every event. Rut the distinction between things as they appear to the senses (phenomena) and things accessible to the pure intellect (noumcna), as well as the discovery of the equivalence between frccly determined action and action determined i~ndcr the representation of the moral law, allow Kant a t the same time to adopt a position that is in certain respects very close to the position of Crusius, which hc criticized in the New Elucidation: it is also true t o say that at each instant there is n o other antecedently dctcrmining reason of action than the will itself, acting under the representation of the moral la\\,-whether or not the agent makes this law the supreme principle of the discrimination and ordering of his or her maxims. The temporal determination of the action is no more than the expansion over timc of an atemporal relation of the agent to the moral law for which, at every instant, s/he can and should be held accountable. I will not try t o untangle the well-known difficulties of Kant's position here. I will note only that the determination of the maxims of action under the legislation of the categorical imperative-"I ought always to act in such a way that I could will that the maxim of ~n y action should become a universal law of naturenhas, in the domain of morality, a role parallel to the role held in the domain of cognition by the determination of the laws of nature under the unity of self-conscio~~s-ness that makes possible the unity of experience. The unity of self-consciousness, in its relation to the impressions of the senses, is the determining reason of the representation of reasons for an event's taking place, having taken place, or being about to take place, that is, having a determinate position in timc. Similarly, thc unity of selfconsciousness, in its relation to impulses and feelings of pleasure and displeasure, is the determining ground ( B e s t i m m u n g g r~n d )~~ of the representation of reasons for action, which can in general be represented as possiblc antecedents of hypothetical judgments of the form: if p, then d o a. But the unity of self-conscio~~sness here is not simply a (transcendental) reason or ground of (empirical) grounds. Rather, it is an additional reason for action: not only is it the sourte of the representation of reasons together with the form of their unity, but it is also itself a reason of action that is that form itself; motivating the choice of a maxim for the sole reason that it is universalizable (that is, can be required as a universal law of nature). It is by virtue of this generating of another reason, a reason beyond reasons (or perhaps beneath reasons, underlying all reasons), which is none other that the form itselj'of the absolute unity of reasons, that Kant can claim to have discovered a notion of freedom far more radical than that of Leibniz, which transcends the principle of sufficient reason defined in the domain of reasons.
Significantly, it is again in the vocabulary of 1755 that Kant defines the relationship between the moral law and freedom: freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, and the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedon~.~' But this vocabulary really indicates that we have now arrived at the limit of antecedently determining reasons. For human freedom, there is n o other reason than a ratio cognoscendi, moral law as a Faktum of reason (Vernunft) (not a given of reason, but rather a production of reason)."" In the New Elucidation, for God only a ground of knowing could be stated, and not a ground of being or existing. With the critical system, for man as a free being we must affirm that we have a ground of knowing but not that we have a ground of being or existing. O f course, according t o Kant the same ground of knowing-the moral law-that leads us to af-firm the existence of human freedom, leads us also to postulate the existence of God as a ground for the synthetic connection between virtue and happiness. But this only serves to widen the gap between this and Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. The existence of God is not affirmed by an ontological, cosmological, or physico-theological proof (God does not have in Himself His ground, nor does the affirmation of His existence result from the ultimate application to finite things of the principle of antecedently determining reason). The existence of God is postulated by virtue of a ratio that is not even a ratio crgnoscendi, but rather a ratio credendi, which human reason generates from its own resources as the only possible response to its inescapable demand for the Highest GOO^.^'
In brief: the thinned-out version of the principle of sufficient reason defended by Kant in his critical philosophy depends on the unity of self-consciousness that, he maintains, conditions all knowledge of objects on the one hand, and on the other, the ordered unity of the maxims of action under the legislation of the moral law. The destinies of the two notions-unity of self-consciousness, principle of sufficient reason-are from now on linked, for better or for worse: to dethrone the one is also to dethrone the other (as we can see for instance in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche).
But there is another way of challenging Kant's principle of sufficient reason: in Kant's argument, as we have seen, the principle in all its aspects is dependent on an Aristotelian predicative logic, which provides discursive thought with its form and toward which temporal syntheses are guided. T o put this predicative logic in question is to deprive the principle of reason of its relevance in both of the senses the critical Kant gives it (logical principle of reason of propositions, the transcendental principle of reason of the temporal order of appearances). O f this principle there would then only remain, at best, a modest methodological imperative-for every thing and every event, there must be an explanation, which one must seek;"2 for every action there must be a reason, which one must understand. And a practical imperative of autonomy: for one's own actions, one should, as much as can be done, be in a position t o hold oneself accountable.
It is therefore tempting to disconnect Kant's argument in the Analogies of Experience from Kant's defense of the old principle of sufficient reason. One will then take Kant's Analogies to be either an explanation and a defense of the epistemological presuppositions o f Newtonian natural science ( t h e option of NeoKantianism, taken up today by Michael Friedman) ." O r one will take it to be an explanation of the necessary conditions of our ordinary perceptual experience, which one must reconstruct without any reference at all to Kant's dubious scholastic heritage (the option of Strawson and his followers)." 111 this paper I have tried to offer a third option. I have tried to show that taking Kant's scholastic heritage seriously does not mean reducing his view to this heritage, but on the contrary enables us to measure the full extent of the reversal he imposed upon it. Following up and reconstructing Kant's argument all the way to its origin in the principle of suf5cient reason and the reversal of its proof, then, echoes more familiar themes in today's philosophical concerns: the relation between reasons and causes and the determination of reasons from a self-consciousness that has the capacity to generate from itself the norms of its theoretical and practical activity." How and why the modern developments of these themes differ from Kant's, and what they nevertheless owe to hirn-it will take many more papers to try to come to terms with this question. cp
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